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I. INTRODUCTION
The most studied and academically debated laws regarding outer
space consist of the five United Nations treaties, which were entered
into force from 1967 to 1984. After this condensed period of treaty
activity, United Nations resolutions and principles took the place of
treaties on which consensus otherwise needed to be achieved. Hard
space law developed primarily at the national level in the form of vari-
ous acts or regulations adopted by individual nation states. Even
though formal laws can typically be promulgated more quickly at the
national level, such hard laws still may not be the most efficient
method for governmental legal oversight. Formulation of laws can no
longer keep pace with the technological innovations that drive the
aerospace industry. Often informal laws, through industry self-regu-
lation or contract, prove more effective in protecting the rights of those
engaged in such activities and public safety. The informal regulation
of space activities will likely supplant the role that formal laws once
held except where targeted, formal laws are needed to fill gaps left
through informal regulation.
In the United States, one example of a blend of informal and for-
mal law is the regulation of the nascent space tourism industry. Until
the design and engineering of launch, orbital, and reentry vehicles are
validated, formal regulation of the industry must be flexible, liberal,
and practical. The United States Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") has recently followed this approach in the promulgation of
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Holland & Hart LLP, Denver, Colorado.
2008] INFORMAL REGULATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES 531
regulations on human space flight. After weighing several competing
interests and policies to avoid artificial or rigid barriers that might
stifle innovation unnecessarily, the regulations intentionally impose
the least restrictive requirements that encourage safety. The develop-
ment of the regulations reflects a model for cooperation between the
industry and its regulating agency. In response, the industry has be-
gun regulating itself and, where needed, seeking formal laws to sup-
plement its self-regulation.
In 1995, the Commercial Space Launch Activities Act ("CSLA")
comprehensively legislated launch and reentry activities.1 By delega-
tion, it authorized the FAA to regulate launches, reentries, and the
operation of sites.2 Until 2004, the FAA had licensed only operators of
expendable launch vehicles, but in that year, it issued two reusable
launch vehicle ("RLV") licenses for missions involving an on-board pi-
lot. Congress thereafter adopted amendments to the CSLA to address
human space transportation for hire, mandating that the FAA pro-
mulgate regulations for human space flight.3 The FAA issued a for-
mal Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for human space flight
requirements, setting out proposed regulations to address these ar-
eas. 4 The final rule was issued on December 15, 2006.5 Simultane-
ously, the FAA received comments on its proposed regulations for
experimental permits for reusable suborbital launch vehicles, which
were finalized on April 6, 2007.6
Both the U.S. statute and the administrative regulations admira-
bly balance protection of the affected public and government controls.
Although such provisions constitute law promulgated through formal
legislation and rulemaking, they rely heavily on a component of self-
regulation by the industry.
II. DESIGN AND OPERATIONS
For instance, the regulations impose general safety requirements
for human space flight, but nonetheless give companies substantial
flexibility in the design and operation of spacecraft, subject only to
narrow requirements for protection of crews and space flight partici-
1. 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-70121 (2000).
2. See id. §§ 322(a), 70101-70121.
3. Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 ("CSLAA"), 49 U.S.C.
§§ 70101-70120 (Supp. V 2005).
4. Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants, 70
Fed. Reg. 77262 (proposed Dec. 29, 2005) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 401, 415,
431, 435, 440, 450, 460) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
5. Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants, 71
Fed. Reg. 75616 (Dec. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 401, 415, 431, 435,
440, 460).
6. Experimental Permits for Reusable Suborbital Rockets, 72 Fed. Reg. 17001 (Apr.
6, 2007) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 401, 404-06, 413, 415, 420, 431, 437).
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pants. Until 2012, the FAA may only restrict or prohibit design fea-
tures that have resulted in serious or fatal injuries to crews or space
flight participants during a licensed or commercial human space flight
or contributed to an unplanned event that posed a high risk of causing
serious or fatal injuries. 7 As the FAA stated in its comments on the
final rule, "For the next six years, the FAA has to wait for harm to
occur or almost occur before it can improve restrictions."8
The regulations also balance competing interests between govern-
mental requirements and industry standards by imposing only limited
controls on cabin conditions, including environmental and life support
systems, smoke detection, fire suppression, and security.9 The opera-
tor may choose the best method for achieving general safety require-
ments by employing active or passive systems, on board or remote
operations, or open-loop or closed-loop systems.1 0 To obtain an experi-
mental permit, the spacecraft engineer may validate the technology
quickly, without all the hurdles otherwise required for a license.11
Despite the hands-off approach of formal government regulation,
the industry is under intense, external pressure to create safe and re-
liable designs. Before an operator can obtain a launch license, it must
provide minimum levels of insurance.1 2 Both insurers and operators
recognize the tremendous costs to insure an activity based on untested
or unproven technologies or applications, particularly when that activ-
ity may result in human fatalities (of crews, participants, or the pub-
lic) in the event of a failure. By some accounts, insurance policy costs
will continue to be extremely high until operators establish a track
record of safety by flying at least three times without mishap, with a
total of ten to fifteen launches across the industry.1 3 Failure by one
company is likely to increase insurance costs across the board, spur-
ring the industry's interest in ensuring the safe activities of even its
competitors.
To the same effect, regulations mandate that an operator make
disclosure to the space flight participant of the known hazards and
risks that could result in a serious injury, death, disability, or total
partial loss of physical or mental function; the fact that participation
7. 49 U.S.C. § 70105(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
8. Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants, 71
Fed. Reg. at 75624.
9. 14 C.F.R. §§ 460.11, 460.13, 460.53 (2008).
10. Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants, 71
Fed. Reg. at 75622.
11. 14 C.F.R. §§ 437.5, 437.7, 437.9, 437.11, 437.13,437.21; Experimental Permits for
Reusable Suborbital Rockets, 72 Fed. Reg. at 17002 ("A permit provides an alter-
native to licensing for operators of reusable suborbital rockets.").
12. 14 C.F.R. § 440.9 (2008).
13. Colin Clark, "Space Tourism Insurance to Be Expensive," SPACE NEWS, Feb. 11,
2008.
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may result in a serious injury, death, disability, or total partial loss of
physical or mental function; and the safety record of all crewed vehi-
cles. 14 In turn, the safety record must include statistics about death
or injury to people on the flights, the number of catastrophic failures,
the number of vehicle flights, the number of safety-related anomalies
or failure, and any corrective actions taken to resolve them.15 The
safety record is not limited to the vehicle on which the space flight
participant will be traveling but all crewed space vehicles developed
by any company. 16 The FAA is considering developing a database on
the safety record for both government and private sector transport to
aid in this disclosure but not to excuse the obligation of the operator to
provide such information on its own. 17
Mandating disclosure of the industry's safety record creates an in-
centive for self-regulation among the elite group of companies that
have developed, or are developing, spacecraft. Failures by any com-
pany threaten the safety record of all, make space flight appear too
perilous, and risk the imposition of heavy-handed government regula-
tion. Peer pressure, coupled with economic necessity, will likely prove
a stronger motivator than formal government regulation.
III. SPACE FLIGHT PARTICIPANTS
As it pertains to space flight participants, the statute limited the
FAA's control almost exclusively to regulating the disclosure of infor-
mation.1 8 As noted above, under the CSLAA, to obtain a license or
permit, the operator must certify that it has informed the space flight
participants of the risks of launch and reentry, including the safety
record of the vehicle type; that the U.S. government has not certified
the launch vehicle as safe for carrying humans; that the space flight
participant has provided written, informed consent to participate; and
that the operator has complied with FAA regulations.19
In the resulting regulations, the FAA balanced competing views of
the role of government to protect space flight participants. Weighing
in favor of personal responsibility, the regulations require that space
flight participants be trained to respond to emergency situations and
14. 14 C.F.R. § 460.45 (2008).
15. Id. § 460.45(c)-(d).
16. Id. § 460.45(c).
17. Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants, 71
Fed. Reg. 75616, 75625 (Dec. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 401, 415,
431, 435, 440, 460).
18. 49 U.S.C. § 70105 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); Human Space Flight Requirements for
Crew and Space Flight Participants, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75624 ("Instead [of restrict-
ing design features and operating practices,] Congress requires that space flight
participants be informed of the risks.").
19. 49 U.S.C. § 70105(b)(5) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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to avoid jeopardizing the safety of flight crews or the public. 20 How-
ever, riders need not take any medical examinations and will not be
required by law to receive the same training as crews. 2 1
In the comment phase of these regulations, some parties strongly
advocated that the role of the government included protecting the par-
ticipants from their own, unwise decisions. The FAA assumed, how-
ever, that a spaceflight participant would choose to consult with his or
her own physician before embarking on such an adventure, and this
assumed self-interest in personal safety overrode the motivation for
formal government regulation. Similarly, the space flight participant
could be expected to make informed decisions about risks of design or
operational failures either with the help of chosen professionals or in-
dependently, but without the need for direct government intervention.
Even if the space flight participant acts differently than expected,
this regulatory scheme has in practice encouraged self-regulation by
the operators. Both Virgin Galactic and XCOR Aerospace, the two
leading personal space flight companies, require contractual medical
clearances from all participants. In addition, the companies insist
that participants undergo flight training to a greater degree than is
otherwise required by regulation. Again, economic necessity, driven
by possible adverse public reaction to a negative participant experi-
ence or by risk of liability lawsuits, will prompt a greater degree of
targeted self-regulation than a comprehensive regulatory scheme.
Despite the strong incentives for companies to operate safely, the
federal regulations do require space flight participants to sign a
waiver and an informed consent acknowledging that the participants
understand the risks and that their presence on board the vehicle is
voluntary.22 The waiver required in the final rule protects only the
government, not the operator, ensuring that the operator is not re-
lieved statutorily of its duties of care toward space flight
participants.23
This is one area in which the regulations do not create the strong-
est motivation for self-regulation. For protection of operators, infor-
mal methods must fill the statutory gap in the law's liability
protections. Rather than assume the potential liability for an opera-
tional failure and work to avoid it, operators take a practical approach
of requiring each space flight participant to execute a separate con-
tractual waiver and release to accompany any informed consent.
Under some state laws, waivers are contrary to public policy for the
20. 14 C.F.R. §§ 460.51, 460.53.
21. Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants, 71
Fed Reg. at 75626 ("The FAA is not requiring that a space flight participant ob-
tain a physical examination."); 14 C.F.R. §§ 460.51, 460.53.
22. 14 C.F.R. § 460.45(f).
23. Id. § 460.49.
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very reason that waivers create disincentives for companies to operate
safely. 24 An enforceable contractual waiver will need a choice of law
provision so that the waiver is not inadvertently nullified by a state
law. What the regulations leave open, the parties will make firm by
way of contract, albeit contracts that will be tested under a state com-
mon law scheme.
IV. CREW TRAINING
The regulations require licensees to adequately train crews so as
not to create additional perils.25 Although this general requirement
exists in the law, operators have flexibility to determine the best
training methods. Crew training devices must "realistically re-
present[] the vehicle's configuration and mission" or the operator
must advise crew members of the differences. 2 6 The training must be
updated to reflect lessons learned and to ensure that crew qualifica-
tions are current.2 7 Rather than apply a one-size-fits-all approach to
training, however, the FAA believes that it can more appropriately
account for the diversity in vehicles by adding terms and conditions
specific to the vehicle in the license or permit. 28 While this creates
initial uncertainty about the regulatory process, it appears to be the
only practical means for achieving the goal of encouraging adequate
training of crew members.
Here again, private industry fills the gap left by generalized regu-
lation. Training facilities have developed to meet this need.
V. INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
The Personal Space Flight Federation is an industry association
formed to provide a cohesive voice to this developing industry. The
mission of the federation is to "promote the development of commer-
cial human spaceflight, pursue ever higher levels of safety, and share
best practices and expertise throughout the industry."29 The group
resolved at its formation in 2005 to develop a Voluntary Personal
Spaceflight Industry Consensus Standards Organization to develop
24. Louisiana, Montana, and Virginia have not enforced such contractual waivers.
John Sadler, Are Waiver/Releases Worth the Paper They Are Written On?, http://
www.sadlersports.com/riskmanagement/sports-insurance-waiverrelease.html
(last visited July 25, 2008).
25. 14 C.F.R. §§ 460.5, 460.7.
26. Id. § 460.7.
27. Id.
28. Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants, 70
Fed. Reg. 77262, 77265 (proposed Dec. 29, 2005) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 401,
415, 431, 435, 440, 450, 460).
29. Personal Spaceflight Federation, http://www.personalspaceflight.org/ (last visited
July 25, 2008).
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standards for implementing the CSLAA.30 While working toward de-
velopment of such standards, the group intends to distribute best
practices for safety in spaceport operations, crew and participant
training, and vehicle manufacture, operations, and maintenance.31
It also identified as an early goal the need to develop stronger state
laws for liability protection. Among other activities, it has drafted and
promoted a model state law for the governance of personal space
flight. The model law was adopted in Virginia first, effective July
2007. 32 It provides that if the federally-required disclosures and
warning are given, the space flight participant's written acknowledge-
ment and waiver will create immunity for the space flight operator. 33
No lawsuit may be maintained against the operator unless the dam-
age resulted from willful and wanton, or intentional, conduct. 34 Vir-
ginia has been competing as the Mid-Atlantic Regional Space Port to
serve as a spaceport for this nascent industry.
Florida was next to follow suit. Florida Statutes § 331.501 was cre-
ated to provide limited protection to spaceflight entities. 35 Qualified
spaceflight entities must hold an FAA license and meet the state stat-
utory requirements for warning spaceflight participants. 3 6 Then, the
entity will not be liable for injury or death to a participant resulting
from the inherent risks of spaceflight activities. 3 7 However, the en-
tity's protection is limited. Liability exists if the entity was negligent
or acted willfully or wantonly; had actual or constructive knowledge of
a dangerous condition that proximately caused the injury, damage, or
death; or intentionally injured the participant. 38 The breadth of these
exceptions threatens to nullify the protections otherwise afforded
spaceflight entities.
These state laws provide evidence of the balance between formal
and informal laws. The federal regulations took a sufficiently hands-
30. Press Release, Personal Spaceflight Federation, Space Entrepreneurs Resolve to
Create Industry Group to Promote Safety Standards and Growth of the Personal
Spaceflight Industry (Feb. 8, 2005), available at http://www.personalspaceflight.
org/ (follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "Personal Spaceflight Federa-
tion, Space Entrepreneurs Resolve to Create Industry Group to Promote Safety
Standards and Growth of the Personal Spaceflight Industry" hyperlink).
31. Press Release, Personal Spaceflight Federation, Personal Spaceflight Federation
Announces Future Plans (Aug. 22, 2006), available at http://www.personalspace
flight.org/ (follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "Personal Spaceflight
Federation Announces Future Plans" hyperlink).
32. Space Flight & Immunity Act, H.D. 3184, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va.
2007).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. H.R. 737, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2008).
36. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 331.501(1)(c), (2) (West 2008) (effective Oct. 1, 2008).
37. Id. § 331.501(2).
38. Id. § 331.501(2)(b).
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off approach to allow the development of an industry association
whose purpose includes the creation of consensus industry standards.
In turn, the industry federation identified areas needing specific legis-
lation and drafted model laws for adoption by state legislatures. This
partnership among lawmakers and stakeholders has the best chance
of promoting a new industry while ensuring safety of those involved in
an effective manner.
VI. CONCLUSION
Formal laws may not be able to regulate developing space activi-
ties with sufficient speed and flexibility to ensure the viability of the
industry. The CSLAA and implementing regulations defer formal reg-
ulation until such time as the personal flight technologies and prac-
tices have become more refined through trial and error. Meanwhile,
the industry is left to regulate itself, and it has begun to do so through
private contracts and the development of best practices and stan-
dards. Where self-regulation is inadequate, the industry has sought
the enactment of hard law to fill perceived legal gaps. Because strong
incentives exist for careful self-regulation, the government's hands-off
approach is likely to be effective in the personal space flight industry.
